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DO CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS IN 
HIRING PUNISH? 
MICHAEL A. C. LEE

 
INTRODUCTION 
Criminal background checks in the hiring process make it more 
difficult for former offenders to obtain employment at their market skill 
level. As a result, many former offenders end up underemployed or 
unemployed altogether. This obstacle to finding gainful employment is a 
harm, and this harm directly follows from a former offender’s criminal 
conviction. The harm can therefore be thought of as part of the punishment 
imposed on criminal offenders. However, unlike the formal punishment 
that a criminal offender receives through his sentence, the harm that 
follows the offender as he seeks employment after he has completed his 
formal sentence has no basis in punishment theory.
1
 Criminal background 
checks in hiring is a policy that aims at furthering employer interests, not 
punishing criminal offenders. For this reason, the punitive effect of 
criminal background checks often goes overlooked even though there are 
simple, straightforward ways to reform the process without abridging the 
purpose of protecting employers. 
Part I of this note reviews the principal reason why society permits 
employers to conduct criminal background checks in hiring: to protect 
them from organizational risk. The risk that employers face when they hire 
a person with a criminal history is a valid concern, but if we acknowledge 
that employers have good reason to be worried about hiring a person with 
a criminal history, we should also acknowledge that a person with a 
criminal history therefore faces increased employment obstacles as a direct 
result of having committed a crime in the past. Focusing 
disproportionately, if not wholly, on employer interests in justifying 
criminal background checks in hiring means ignoring much, if not all, of 
the other side of the equation. 
Part II of this note focuses on the other side of the equation: the effect 
that criminal background checks in hiring have on job applicants with 
criminal histories. It argues that the effect of running criminal background 
 
 
   Articles Editor, Washington University Jurisprudence Review; J.D. expected 2017, 
Washington University School of Law. 
 1. Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral 
Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 154 (1999). 
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checks in hiring is punitive to former offenders because it diminishes their 
prospects for gainful employment even after they served their sentences. 
This punitive effect opens the door to incidental adverse social effects, 
including substantive harms imposed on the families of former offenders 
as well as macroeconomic loss to society due to former offenders being 
underemployed or unemployed. 
Once we understand that criminal background checks in hiring carries a 
punitive effect for former offenders, the question becomes whether any 
punishment theory justifies continuing to report a former offender’s 
criminal history to employers. Part III of this note reviews theories of 
punishment—retributivism, incapacitation, denunciation, rehabilitation, 
and utilitarianism—to see if the punitive effect of criminal background 
checks in hiring is consistent with any of them. The conclusion is that it is 
not. The analysis then proceeds to explore how the criminal background 
check system can be reformed to bring the punitive effect into accord with 
the theories of punishment while still allowing employers to run 
background checks. 
Part IV finalizes the analysis of criminal background check reform by 
reviewing a relatively recent utilitarian proposal: redemption policy. 
Redemption policy holds that some former offenders can be predicted with 
high accuracy to have demonstrated that they actually pose no greater risk 
to employers than the average job applicant. The note considers some of 
the pros and cons of this approach. 
I. SOCIETY’S JUSTIFICATION FOR CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS IN 
HIRING 
A. The Expressed Concern: Organizational Risk 
The employer practice of conducting criminal background checks on 
individuals applying for jobs is widespread and has been growing even 
more in recent years.
2
 In a 2012 survey by the Society for Human 
Resource Management (“SHRM”), sixty-nine percent of all hiring 
organizations surveyed reported that they conduct background checks on 
all job applicants, and another eighteen percent reported that they conduct 
background checks on candidates for certain jobs—such as those 
involving a fiduciary duty, care for children, public safety, national 
 
 
 2. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT ON CRIMINAL HISTORY 
BACKGROUND CHECKS 1, 2, 21, 38 (JUNE 2006) [HEREINAFTER ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT]. 
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defense, or security services.
3
 A mere fourteen percent of the surveyed 
hiring organizations responded that they do not conduct any sort of 
criminal background check when hiring.
4
 
The interest that employers have in protecting their employees, 
customers, and assets—indeed, their very businesses—from harm is 
obvious. In fact, under the doctrine of negligent hiring, this interest rises to 
the level of a legal duty when it becomes foreseeable that hiring a 
particular person represents a risk of harm to others.
5
 To insulate 
themselves from liability, employers perform a “reasonable investigation” 
into whom they hire, including by conducting criminal background 
checks.
6
 
The SHRM survey also asked each of the surveyed organizations to 
indicate which of the survey’s six provided answer choices reflected the 
organization’s two “primary reasons” for running criminal background 
checks on job candidates.
7
 The top response, selected by fifty-two percent 
of organizations participating in the survey, was “to reduce legal liability 
for negligent hiring.”8 Forty-nine percent indicated that their primary 
reason was to “ensure a safe work environment for employees.”9 Thirty-
six percent said that avoiding “theft and embezzlement” or “other criminal 
activity” was one of their primary reasons.10 Twenty-eight percent 
identified compliance “with applicable state law requiring a background 
check” as a primary reason.11 Seventeen percent noted a primary reason of 
“assess[ing] the overall trustworthiness of the job candidate.”12 The survey 
also provided an answer choice of “other,” which five percent of 
 
 
 3. Society for Human Resource Management, Background Checking—The Use of Criminal 
Background Checks in Hiring Decisions 3, 11 (July 19, 2012), http://www.shrm.org 
/research/surveyfindings/articles/pages/criminalbackgroundcheck.aspx. See also ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 2, at 19–20. 
 4. Society for Human Resource Management, supra note 3, at 3, 11. 
 5. ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 2, at 38; Timothy L. Creed, Negligent Hiring 
and Criminal Rehabilitation: Employing Ex-Convicts, Yet Avoiding Liability, 20 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 
183, 186–88 (2008) (citing Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. 1983)); Se. 
Apartments Mgmt., Inc. v. Jackman, 513 S.E.2d 395, 397 (Va. 1999) (quoting Ponticas, 331 N.W.2d at 
911); Di Cosala v. Kay, 450 A.2d 508, 515 (N.J. 1982). 
 6. Creed, supra note 5, at 188, 190 (citing Perkins v. Spivey, 911 F.2d 22, 31 (8th Cir. 1990)). 
 7. Society for Human Resource Management, supra note 3, at 6. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Society for Human Resource Management, supra note 3, at 6. 
 12. Id. 
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organizations listed as one of their two responses.
13
 Put straightforwardly, 
employers are concerned about organizational risk.
14
 
States and the federal government collect and store a vast array of data 
on offenders who pass through their criminal justice systems.
15
 Modern 
information technology makes much of this data readily accessible to 
anyone legally authorized to obtain it.
16
 Furthermore, while the cost of 
running a criminal background check on job applicants varies by 
jurisdiction, it is easily affordable (especially if the cost is passed on to the 
job candidate), costing only about twenty dollars for a state report
17
 or a 
Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”) fingerprint-based report.18 Given 
this low cost, plus the incentive for employers to conduct a reasonable 
investigation into whom they hire,
19
 the popularity of criminal background 
checks in hiring makes sense.
20
 
B. The Limited Legal Oversight of Criminal Background Checks in Hiring 
Employers have great discretion in making hiring decisions. They are 
subject to some degree of legal oversight, but that oversight fails to protect 
all job applicants with criminal histories. In the context of criminal 
 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. See El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 244 (3d Cir. 2007) (“In a broad sense, hiring 
policies . . . ultimately concern the management of risk.”) 
 15.  ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 2, at 13–18; Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori 
Nakamura, Redemption in the Presence of Widespread Criminal Background Checks, 47 
CRIMINOLOGY 327, 330 (2009). 
 16. Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 15, at 328–29; see also ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, 
supra note 2, at 13–18 (“The [Federal Bureau of Investigation] maintains an automated database that 
integrates criminal history records, including arrest information and corresponding disposition 
information, submitted by state, local, and federal criminal justice agencies. Each state has a criminal 
records repository responsible for the collection and maintenance of criminal history records submitted 
by law enforcement agencies in its state.”); Cf. Margaret Colgate Love, Paying Their Debt to Society: 
Forgiveness, Redemption, and the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, 54 HARV. L.J. 
753, 772–73, n. 85 (2011) (noting that a simple “Google” search of a person’s name brings up 
unsolicited internet advertisements from private screening companies offering a criminal background 
check for a nominal fee). 
 17. ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 2, at 21 (reporting that, in 2006, fees for state 
fingerprint-based checks ranged from $5 to $75, with $20 being the average). 
 18. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Identity History Summary Checks: Frequently Asked 
Questions, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks/faqs (last visited Oct. 
25, 2015); see also ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 2, at 21, 139–41 (reviewing the 
various FBI reports and their associated prices). 
 19. Creed, supra note 5, at 183, 186; ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT at 38; Blumstein & 
Nakamura, supra note 15, at 329; Society for Human Resource Management, supra note 3. 
 20. Cf. Elizabeth A. Gerlach, Comment, The Background Check Balancing Act: Protecting 
Applicants with Criminal Convictions while Encouraging Criminal Background Checks in Hiring, 8 
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 981 (2006). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol9/iss2/9
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background checks in hiring, Title VII protects job applicants who are 
members of a protected class (i.e., race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin)
21
 and who are denied employment because they have criminal 
records by allowing them to make a discrimination claim based on a 
disparate impact theory.
22
 The Supreme Court recognized in Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co. that Title VII permits disparate impact claims for 
employment practices.
23
 That decision came down the year after Gregory 
v. Litton Systems, Inc., in which the Central District of California was first 
to rule that discrimination on the basis of arrest records constituted 
disparate impact in violation of Title VII.
24
 In Green v. Missouri Pacific 
Railroad Co., the Eighth Circuit held that a disparate impact Title VII 
violation occurs when an employer categorically disqualifies former 
offenders from employment simply because of their criminal histories. In 
the words of that court: 
an employment test or practice which operates to exclude a 
disproportionate percentage of blacks violates Title VII unless the 
employer can establish that the practice is justified as a business 
necessity. . . . Once a prima facie case of substantially disparate 
impact is made the burden shifts to the employer to justify the 
employment practice or test as a business necessity.
25
 
Two years later, the Eighth Circuit identified three factors to consider 
when determining whether an employment practice meets the “business 
necessity” test: “the nature and gravity of the offense or offenses, the time 
that has passed since the conviction and/or completion of sentence, and the 
nature of the job for which the [candidate] has applied.”26 
 
 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
 22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(a)(i) (2012). 
 23. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (“If an employment practice which 
operates to exclude [African Americans] cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the 
practice is prohibited.”); United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Consideration of 
Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (2012) available at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/arrest_conviction.cfm#I (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2015) [hereinafter EEOC Guidelines]. 
 24. Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Creed, supra note 
5, at 195. 
 25. Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1293 (8th Cir. 1975). In a world in which the 
demographics of the population of former offenders were aligned to the demographics of the United 
States, this holding would be null. Disparate impact would not exist. The practice of denying 
employment to former offenders solely on the basis of their criminal record would be permitted. This 
is just another way of understanding that the Green court was concerned with racial discrimination, not 
with discrimination against former criminal offenders. 
 26. Id. 
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Today, Title VII provides that unlawful disparate impact occurs when:
 
 
a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular 
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails 
to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the 
position in question and consistent with business necessity . . . .
 27
 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) publishes 
guidelines for navigating Title VII’s coverage of employment decisions 
when criminal background checks are involved.
28
 
The EEOC itself also institutes enforcement actions, including through 
administrative proceedings and litigation, regarding the proper use of 
criminal background checks in the hiring process.
29
 While Title VII does 
technically constrain employment decisions by offering some degree of 
protection to some former offenders who apply for jobs, its practical reach 
is limited for at least two reasons. 
First, the disparate impact protection of Title VII is not available to all. 
Some former offenders have no legal entitlement to a claim.
30
 Employers 
are not as restricted from categorically dismissing these former offenders 
for the sole reason that they have a criminal past.
31
 
Second, discrimination is hard to conclusively prove when an employer 
declines to hire a former offender.
32
 Even if a former offender who is part 
of a protected class could make a prima facie disparate impact claim, “the 
burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.”33 An employer 
then may be able to persuade the factfinder that its hiring decision was 
justified by business necessity,
34
 or that the decision had nothing to do 
with the former offender’s criminal history. Hiring an employee is a 
private decision involving an employer’s judgment about who would be a 
good fit, and that decision is not easy for outsiders—even courts—to 
 
 
 27. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 23. 
 28. Id. 
 29. United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Administrative Enforcement and 
Litigation, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/enforcement_litigation.cfm (last visited Nov. 22, 2015). 
 30. Creed, supra note 5, at 195. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 34. Green, 523 F.2d at 1293. 
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assess after the fact.
35
 Employers often can, and do, choose whom to hire 
from among multiple job applicants. If another applicant who does not 
have a criminal history, then an employer might just hire that person over 
the individual with a criminal history and argue later that the decision was 
based on education, experience, compatibility with organizational culture, 
or some other seemingly innocuous factor that made the person a more 
desirable hire.  
II. THE HARMFUL EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS IN 
HIRING 
A. The Punitive Effect 
Regardless of whether allowing pervasive criminal background checks 
in hiring carries a positive net result for society, ignoring the costs is 
unfair to those who shoulder them. Indeed, only by considering the costs is 
it even possible to determine whether criminal background checks in 
hiring truly produce a positive net social benefit.
36
 Furthermore, limiting 
society’s available alternatives to either (a), allowing employers to conduct 
criminal background checks in hiring, or (b), disallowing all criminal 
background checks in hiring, misses more nuanced alternatives that could 
result in greater social benefit than either of these binary extremes. 
A crime is an act that is in violation of society’s express moral 
prohibitions, as stated in its criminal law.
37
 When an individual commits a 
crime, that individual may be indicted, prosecuted, convicted, and 
punished for his criminal conduct.
38
 In the United States, when society 
prosecutes and convicts a defendant for violating the criminal law,
39
 it 
makes its announcement of conviction through a verdict reached and 
delivered by a jury, and makes the announcement of the punishment 
through the court’s declaration of the offender’s sentence. These are 
 
 
 35. Cf. Sharon M. Dietrich, Criminal Records and Employment: Ex-Offenders Thwarted in Their 
Attempts to Earn a Living for Their Families, in EVERY DOOR CLOSED: BARRIERS FACING PARENTS 
WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 13, 18 (Amy E. Hirsch et al. eds., 2002). 
 36. ANTHONY E. BOARDMAN ET AL., COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 1 (3d 
ed. 2006). 
 37. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, The Moral Quality of the Criminal Law, 54 NW. U. L. REV. 
575, 576 (1959–1960). 
 38. Note the multiple steps that must be taken for a person to actually be punished for violating 
society’s moral standards. Not only must the legislature prohibit a certain behavior, there must also be 
enforcement. 
 39. It is, in fact, society that prosecutes and convicts. Case names denoting “People v. ___,” 
“State v. ___,” or “Commonwealth v. ___” are not mere legal formalities; they represent the actual 
parties to the action. 
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serious, formal procedures that carry with them the weight of society’s 
condemnation of the convicted criminal’s immoral behavior. Furthermore, 
by imposing the sentence in the same course of proceedings as when the 
verdict is delivered, an offender hears and is aware of the connection 
between his or her immoral behavior and the sanction received. If a 
punishment were to be imposed on an offender outside of this process, or 
long after the time of the offense, or without ever having been announced, 
the relation between the punishment and the underlying immoral behavior 
would diminish.
40
  
Imagine that an offender receives a sentence of incarceration. A court 
of law pronounces the sentence to him, and the offender is transferred to 
the State’s custody until he completes that sentence. After the offender 
completes the sentence, he is released from the State’s custody and rejoins 
society, but with some limitations.
41
 After returning to live with general 
society, the former offender may again apply for jobs. While he has 
fulfilled the entirety of his formal sentence, as declared by the courts, that 
is rarely the end of the tribulations society imposes on him as a direct 
consequence of his crime. Like his competing job applicants, he will be 
subject to criminal background checks in hiring. But unlike many of his 
competing job applicants, the employer will see that the former offender 
has a criminal history, which may foreclose to the former offender much 
economic opportunity even though he fulfilled his formal criminal 
sentence. Criminal background checks in hiring amount to punishment for 
former offenders because the criminal histories those background checks 
relate have the effect of imposing a major obstacle to obtaining gainful 
employment as a direct consequence of the former offender’s past crime.42  
 
 
 40. See, e.g., Barry F. Singer, Psychological Studies of Punishment, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 405, 418–
21 (1970); Yair Listokin, Crime and (With a Lag) Punishment: The Implications of Discounting for 
Equitable Sentencing, 44 AM. CRIM. LAW. REV. 115, 17 (2007) (“Because of discounting, two 
otherwise equivalent sentences imposed at different lags after the crime will have differential 
severities.”). 
 41. For example, upon release from incarceration a former offender proceeds into the 
parole/probation system where his or her conduct and progress are monitored. Other limitations on the 
extent to which former offenders truly “rejoin” society include an array of what some scholars refer to 
as “collateral sentencing consequences,” such as restriction from eligibility for certain governmental 
benefits (e.g., housing, welfare), denial of voting rights, and others. See Demleitner, supra note 1, 
passim. 
 42. Demleitner, supra note 1, at 156 (citing BILL HEBENTON & TERRY THOMAS, CRIMINAL 
RECORDS: STATE, CITIZEN AND THE POLITICS OF PROTECTION 113 (1993)). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol9/iss2/9
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B. The Punitive Effect as an Externality 
Jerome Hall argues that “the meaning of ‘liberty under law’” is that 
“the restraint of penal law makes freedom possible.”43 Under this theory, 
when liberty is taken away as a stated consequence for criminal 
wrongdoing, there is liberty under law. This means that liberty is 
conditional; you get it only if you do not violate society’s moral code. 
However, when liberty is taken away arbitrarily, without punitive 
justification, there is no liberty under law—only liberty arbitrarily 
afforded. This holds true for criminal background checks in hiring. The 
punitive effect of criminal background checks is a type of deprivation of 
liberty because former offenders are not free to pursue employment 
without the obstacle of their criminal history being reported. But this is not 
liberty under law because the loss of job search liberty is not per se what 
the law provides for. Rather, as analyzed in Part I, the law provides for 
criminal background checks in hiring as a means of helping employers. 
Offenders are given no notice of losing this liberty.  
The punitive effect is not purposely imposed as punishment for 
wrongdoing. It is a hidden punishment in the form of a sentence from the 
market.
44
 It is hidden because it is not imposed until after the formal 
sentence is handed down, nor is it ever announced by society through the 
court as part of an offender’s formal sentence. Rather, the punitive effect 
simply results, extraneously, as employers conduct criminal background 
checks in hiring to reduce organizational risk. It is extraneous because 
employers do not seek to produce it, nor do they feel its negative effect. 
Furthermore, the punitive effect does not thwart or serve the purpose of 
reducing organizational risk. In theory, employers would be equally 
content—from their own organizational perspective, not from the 
perspective of their personal moral or political beliefs—to avoid the risk of 
hiring a former offender whether or not that same former offender is able 
to find gainful employment somewhere else. 
In sum, the punitive effect of criminal background checks in hiring is 
not imposed as punishment despite the fact that it does punish. The 
punitive effect is imposed without any punishment theory justification. It 
simply results, externally from its designed purpose to protect employer 
interests. The only way to get rid of the punitive effect entirely is to get rid 
of criminal background checks in hiring. But, as will be argued, such a 
 
 
 43. Jerome Hall, The Purposes of a System for the Administration of Criminal Justice, in 
THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT, 380 (Stanley E. Grupp ed., Indiana University Press 1971). 
 44. See Demleitner, supra note 1, at 156; Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 15, at 330. 
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drastic step is not necessary to find punishment theory justifications for the 
punitive effect. 
C. Incidental Social Effects 
The harms of the punitive effect extend further than only making it 
harder for former offenders to find employment. There are incidental 
social effects that flow from underemployment and unemployment of 
former offenders.
45
 These range from consequences suffered by families to 
society-wide macroeconomic loss.
46
 Former offenders who find 
themselves underemployed or unemployed despite their efforts to find 
work are prone to recidivate.
47
 There is widespread agreement that gainful 
employment substantially reduces the likelihood that former offenders will 
reoffend.
48
 There is also evidence that after an initial period of time, the 
longer former offenders remain free of the criminal justice system, the less 
likely they are to reoffend.
49
 
Not only do diminished job opportunities negatively impact both a 
former offender’s chances of avoiding recidivism and his ability to pay for 
basic living necessities, they can also produce cross-generational harms 
when former offenders are not able to provide for their families up to their 
potential.
50
 For example, underemployment or unemployment could result 
in reduced savings or fewer resources that a parent who is a former 
 
 
 45. The concern should not be centered only on the binary question of job versus no job, 
employment versus unemployment. Some former offenders might be able to find employment just fine 
if they lower their reservation values. The variable for employment should not be binary at all; since 
job quality and worker satisfaction matter. A good job will do more to help a former offender avoid 
offending again than will a bad job, even though in both cases former offenders can check off the box 
on the form asking if they are “employed.” 
 46. Cf. Richard B. Freeman, Crime and Unemployment, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY, 90 
(James Q. Wilson ed., ICS Press 1983) (summarizing research that shows a relationship between 
aggregate unemployment and the crime rate, but cautioning that the link may not be as substantial as 
one would suspect and that other variables are at play). 
 47. Creed, supra note 5, at 194.  
 48. ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 2, at 51; Creed, supra note 5, at 194 (citing 
Cindy M. Haerle, Minnesota Developments: Employer Liability for the Criminal Acts of Employees 
Under Negligent Hiring Theory: Ponticas v. K.M.S. Investments, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1303, 1323–24 
(1984)); Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 15, at 329. 
 49. Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 15, at 329. This does not necessarily suggest that 
unemployment causes crime. While there is some evidence that such a linkage between unemployment 
and crime exists, some researchers question both the direction of causality between the two and 
whether there exists a third variable that establishes the connection. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 38 
(reviewing different study methodologies and the general findings of each as to the connection 
between crime and unemployment, and noting that “the cause of both the unemployment and the 
criminal activity may be a third variable having to do with specific attributes of the individuals”). 
 50. AUSTIN NICHOLS, JOSH MITCHELL & STEPHAN LINDNER, CONSEQUENCES OF LONG-TERM 
UNEMPLOYMENT 1, 11 (Urban Institute 2013). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol9/iss2/9
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offender can commit to educating his or her children.
51
 If this results in 
any lack of educational opportunities, systemic obstacles such families 
already confront will grow.
52
 A parent who has to work two jobs instead of 
one will have less time to assist their children with homework.
53
 
As former offenders and their families struggle, some might develop a 
mistrust or contempt for society out of a belief that they were mistreated or 
had no real chance. The difficulties that these families face can harden into 
lifelong challenges. Exacerbating these issues is the fact that in addition to 
whatever reduced employment opportunities former offenders face, they 
are also disqualified from obtaining certain welfare benefits.
54
 Not only 
does this limit the economic stability and flexibility of former offenders, it 
compounds former offenders’ hindrance to obtaining quality 
employment.
55
 
The deprivation of social and welfare rights has further 
marginalized some [former offenders]. Welfare programs, designed 
to assist those in need, may provide cash, in-kind, or indirect 
financial assistance. The welfare system provides a threshold 
beyond which no member of society should fall, while at the same 
time assisting recipients in getting back into the labor market.
56
 
The punitive effect also produces macroeconomic harms. According to 
estimates from a 2010 Center for Economic and Policy Research 
(“CEPR”) report, in 2008 there were twelve to fourteen million former 
offenders of working age in the United States.
57
 Based on the large size of 
this population, the CEPR report further calculated that the punitive effect 
may have lowered the male employment rate in the United States by 1.5 to 
1.7 percentage points, which is equivalent to approximately $57–$65 
billion in lost gross domestic product (in 2008 dollars).
58
 The report 
 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. For example, Ann Huff Stevens and Jessamyn Schaller found that children of a parent who 
loses a job are fifteen percent more likely to repeat a grade in school. Ann Huff Stevens & Jessamyn 
Schaller, Short-Run Effects of Parental Job Loss on Children's Academic Achievement, 30 ECON. 
EDUC. REV. 289, 289 (2011). 
 53. Cf David S. Pedula & Katherine S. Newman, in UNDEREMPLOYMENT: PSYCHOLOGICAL, 
ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES 233, 237 (Douglas C. Maynard & Daniel C. Feldman eds., 
2011). 
 54. Demleitner, supra note 1, at 158. 
 55. Demleitner, supra note 1, at 157. 
 56. Id. at 158. 
 57. John Schmitt and Kris Warner, Ex-Offenders and the Labor Market, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC 
AND POLICY RESEARCH (Nov. 2010), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/ex-
offenders-2010-11.pdf. 
 58. Id. 
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cautions: “[absent] some reform of the criminal justice system, the share 
of [former offenders] in the working-age population will rise substantially 
in coming decades, increasing the employment and output losses 
[estimated] here.”59 
III. PUNISHMENT THEORIES APPLIED TO CRIMINAL BACKGROUND 
CHECKS IN HIRING 
A. Retributivism 
Retribution is the oldest theory of punishment.
60
 It is largely based on 
the concept of desert (that is, what the offender deserves) and that to which 
society is entitled. In a sense, the offender must “retribute,” or “pay back” 
the moral debt his criminal behavior imposed on society.
61
 C. S. Lewis 
defended retribution, and criticized rehabilitation as an alternative theory 
of punishment, in his essay The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment.
62
 
Lewis argued that rehabilitation is problematic for at least two reasons.
63
 
First, to say that society offers a convicted defendant treatment, education, 
or some cure in the hopes of rehabilitating him is disingenuous because 
the treatment, education, or cure is compulsory—the offender has no 
choice but to accept the “rehabilitation.”64 Second, for retributivists like 
Lewis, a person who engages in criminal misconduct naturally deserves 
punishment, and to deny him of it deprives him of his humanity.
65
 For 
Lewis, it was not so much that society needed to justify punishment 
according to its retributive ends; no, the convicted defendant needed it, as 
a humanitarian matter, so that he could become good again.
66
 
“[T]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must 
be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender.”67 
In other words, the punishment a criminal offender receives should be of 
the same measure as his guilt for the crime. Under this premise, a 
retributivist should find punishment that is grossly disproportionate to the 
 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 24 (1972). 
 61. John Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238, 238 (1950). 
 62. C. S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 301, 
302 (Stanley E. Grupp ed., Indiana University Press 1971). 
 63. Lewis, supra note 62. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 303. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2011) (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 
(1987)). 
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criminal act (i.e., extreme in relation to the crime) unfavorable.
68
 Another 
element of retributivism—and this is apparent from the proportionality 
requirement—is that an offender must be able to associate the punishment 
he receives with the behavior the punishment is meant to address. Else, for 
all the offender knows, he is suffering an arbitrary injustice. A simple fix 
would be to announce to the offender up front, in a formal proceeding, that 
as a consequence of his criminal behavior, employers will see his criminal 
history, perhaps until he reestablishes his trustworthiness. 
The issue of proportionality remains, however. And whether there is 
proportionality between the punitive effect of criminal background checks 
and a former offender’s past crimes depends on how the punitive effect of 
criminal background checks in hiring actually harms former offenders. 
There are three ways to interpret how the punitive effect works its harm 
upon former offenders. Under the first, the harm suffered by all former 
offenders is the same. The simple fact that an employer will see that a 
former offender job applicant has a criminal history means the offender is 
less likely to be employed. All former offenders endure the same 
process—submission to a criminal background check when applying for a 
job—and for the same reason—commission of at least one past criminal 
offense. 
Consider the propositions that (1) punishment is the deprivation of a 
right or entitlement and (2) an individual has the right or entitlement of 
access to the labor market.
69
 Since the punitive effect itself is 
undifferentiating in exposing former offenders to some greater degree of 
employment uncertainty than the rest of society, the difference in degree 
being immaterial, all former offenders feel the punishment of diminished 
access to the labor market. One scholar goes as far as to argue that “[t]he 
exclusion of former offenders from vast segments of the labor market . . . 
parallels the effect of restrictions on the [former offenders’] right to 
contract in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.”70 Under this first 
interpretation, the punitive effect is the same for all former offenders. If 
the punitive effect punishes all former offenders equally, by the simple 
fact that all former offenders must submit to it when applying for a job, 
there is no proportionality. A former offender who spent fifteen years in 
prison for several violent crimes submits to criminal background checks 
 
 
 68. See generally Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
 69. Demleitner, supra note 1, at 155–56 (arguing that “the position of individuals in . . . society 
depends to a large extent on their participation in the labor force” and that this is “particularly true for 
the United States”) 
 70. Demleitner, supra note 1, at 156. 
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when applying to jobs just like a former offender who went on probation 
for selling a small amount of marijuana when he was seventeen. It seems 
reasonable, though, that employers would be much more likely to 
overlook the latter former offender’s criminal history than the former’s. 
The second interpretation of how the punitive effect works is that the 
added difficulty former offenders experience in finding employment 
depends less on the fact that they have criminal histories and more on the 
specific information their criminal histories communicate. A former 
offender whose criminal history includes violent crime, several offenses, 
or a certain type of offense that makes them particularly risky for 
employment in a certain field will probably encounter greater difficulty 
finding a job than will someone with a less troublesome history. For 
example, a former offender with a conviction for theft might have a 
tougher time getting a job handling cash than will a former offender who 
is similar in every relevant way except whose conviction was for, say, 
vandalism. The SHRM survey corroborates this. Twenty-six percent of 
surveyed employers responded that they consider a nonviolent 
misdemeanor conviction “very influential” in their decision not to hire a 
job candidate.
71
 But sixty percent responded that they consider a violent 
misdemeanor conviction very influential.
72
 The figure for a nonviolent 
felony was seventy-four percent.
73
 For a violent felony, it was ninety-six 
percent.
74
 
This suggests there is some proportionality between a former 
offender’s criminal history and his difficulty in obtaining employment, 
though labor market circumstances temper that suggestion somewhat. The 
proportionality between the punitive effect and a former offender’s 
criminal history is distant and loose because it is not tied to a punitive 
framework with a basis in the law,
75
 and depends instead on the subjective 
preferences and risk curves of individual employers. And not only do 
employers tend to be risk-averse when hiring for their organizations—
especially if the fact that a person has a criminal history is weighty enough 
to tip the scales for juries in negligent hiring litigation—but, in addition, 
little legal oversight governs hiring practices. Consequently, even when a 
 
 
 71. Society for Human Resource Management, supra note 3, at 7. The survey also reported 
findings of potential employers’ perceptions with regard to severity of past criminal behavior, number 
of convictions, relevance of criminal history to the job applied for, the length of time since the past 
criminal history, and the age of the job candidate. 
 72. Society for Human Resource Management, supra note 3, at 7. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Demleitner, supra note 1, at 160 (noting the lack of proportionality review). 
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job applicant’s criminal history reflects that he poses little actual risk, 
employers would probably tend to be more dismissive of him. The market 
sentence of the punitive effect therefore inclines away from 
proportionality for all types of criminal histories. Given the choice 
between a job candidate with any criminal history and another job 
candidate without one, many employers would choose the latter.
76
 This 
weakens the argument for the second interpretation of how the punitive 
effect works and strengthens the first. 
The third interpretation of how the punitive effect works recognizes 
that both the first and second interpretations are valid. Because employers 
tend to see former offenders as inherently risky, regardless of their 
individual characteristics, all former offenders suffer a baseline-added 
difficulty in obtaining employment when their criminal histories are 
indiscriminately reported to employers. Those with more serious criminal 
histories encounter additional obstacles. However, employers may 
perceive different degrees of risk in the same former offender. In addition, 
two former offenders may have identical criminal histories and yet one of 
them might find work more easily. These possibilities reinforce the 
suspicion that the punitive effect tends toward disproportionality. They 
also highlight the desirability of defining a former offender’s risk more 
precisely. Employer hiring decisions do not accurately measure the risk 
that former offenders pose.
77
 The status quo permits the market sentence 
of the punitive effect to treat similarly situated former offenders 
differently. “To be justifiable, [criminal background checks in hiring] 
should be based on sound penological goals and be narrowly 
circumscribed to accomplish these goals.”78  
B. Incapacitation 
When one takes the principle of deterrence to its extreme, the resulting 
theory is incapacitation. Incapacitation aims to remove criminal offenders 
from society to prevent them from committing further crimes. The 
 
 
 76. To reiterate, twenty-six percent employers in the SHRM survey said a nonviolent 
misdemeanor conviction was “very influential” in their decision not to hire a job candidate. Society for 
Human Resource Management, supra note 3, at 7. 
 77. Cf Colgate Love, supra note 16, at 773 (citing Shawn Bushway et al., Private Providers of 
Criminal History Records: Do You Get What You Pay For?, in BARRIERS TO REENTRY? THE LABOR 
MARKET FOR RELEASED PRISONERS IN POST-INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 174, 174–200 (Shawn Bushway et 
al. eds., 2007)) (noting that the large number of private companies providing criminal background 
checks are largely unregulated). 
 78. Demleitner, supra note 1, at 160 (emphasis added). 
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theoretical basis is that a large portion of crimes are committed by repeat 
offenders, so if a person commits a crime and is convicted, society can 
imprison that person (or otherwise incapacitate him) for the simple 
purpose of ensuring that he will not reoffend.
79
 The incapacitation theory 
is an offshoot of the utilitarian theory since its merits rely on a net cost-
benefit analysis involving a comparison of the social benefit stemming 
from reduced crime to the social loss stemming from increased 
incarceration costs.
80
 A downside to this theory is that it results in over-
incapacitation, since not all who commit a criminal offense will inevitably 
go on to commit another. For this reason, some argue for a more cautious 
approach to incapacitation, where the focus is on offenders who are highly 
likely to commit more crimes.
81
 
The only logical relationship by which the punitive effect of criminal 
background checks in hiring could serve incapacitation goals is if it 
disables would-be criminals from offending. But the logical relationship 
by which the punitive effect of criminal background checks thwarts the 
goals of incapacitation is actually clearer. The underlying theory of 
incapacitation is that repeat offenders substantially drive the crime rate, so 
they should be locked up to prevent them from engaging in criminal 
activity. But not all offenders can remain locked up indefinitely; 
eventually, people return to society where they have to support 
themselves. If it is difficult to support oneself, such as happens when a 
criminal record makes it hard to get a job, there is a risk that the individual 
will turn to illegal means of support. In other words, if criminal 
background checks make it harder for former offenders to obtain satisfying 
employment, and some former offenders in that position turn to criminal 
conduct as a response, criminal background checks actually have potential 
to stimulate criminal activity.  
 
 
 79. Andrew D. Leipold, Recidivism, Incapacitation, and Criminal Sentencing Policy, 3 U. ST. 
THOMAS. L. J. 536, 554 (2005–2006); Kent Scheidegger & Michael Rushford, The Social Benefits of 
Confining Habitual Criminals, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 59 (1999–2000). 
 80. Malcom M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy 
of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 458 (1992) (“Incapacitation promises to 
reduce the effects of crime in society not by altering either offender or social context, but by 
rearranging the distribution of offenders in society.”). 
 81. Alex R. Piquero & Alfred Blumstein, Does Incapacitation Reduce Crime?, 23 J. 
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 267, 267–68 (2007); Leipold, supra note 79, at 555 (suggesting that 
factors such as education and prior employment could be used by a court deciding whether to impose 
an “incapacitative premium” on an offender’s sentence). 
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C. Denunciation 
“The denunciation theory holds that punishment is justified when the 
offender has violated the rules that society has used to define itself.”82 
“Society is the proper entity to inflict the punishment because it was the 
victim of the crime.”83 The point is to publicly declare society’s 
disapproval of an offender’s immoral conduct in the context of responding 
to that conduct. 
It is the expression of the community’s hatred, fear, or contempt for 
the convict which alone characterizes physical hardship as 
punishment. If this is what a ‘criminal’ penalty is, then we can say 
readily enough what a ‘crime’ is. . . . It is conduct which, if duly 
shown to have taken place, will incur a formal and solemn 
pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the community.
84
 
Joel Feinberg argues that the “definition of legal punishment” must 
include both the expressive element of society’s disapproval, the 
‘reprobative function,” and the physical element of the sentence, what he 
calls “the hard treatment.”85 For him, a crucial distinction between 
denunciation and retribution is the manner in which each requires that the 
punishment “fit the crime.” Under retribution, the physical punishment 
must fit the crime. Under denunciation, the “condemnatory aspect of the 
punishment” must fit the crime.86 This “is precisely the element in 
punishment that makes possible the performance of such symbolic 
functions as disavowal, non-acquiescence, vindication, and absolution.”87 
The social stigma of criminality, brought about by a guilty verdict, is 
therefore legitimated. Similarly, so is the possibility of redemption. 
Denunciation does not mean exile. According to Nora Demleitner, 
“[d]enunciation does not aim at permanent exclusion but rather at 
reintegrating the offender into society after shaming her.”88 This 
 
 
 82. Ronald J. Rychlak, Society’s Moral Right to Punish: A Further Exploration of the 
Denunciation Theory of Punishment, 65 TUL. L. REV. 299, 301 (1990–1991). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Henry M. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 405 (1958) 
(quoting George K. Gardner, Bailey v. Richardson and the Constitution of the United States, 33 B.U.L. 
REV. 176, 193 (1953) (quotation marks omitted)). 
 85. Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW 467, 470 (Jules L. Coleman ed. 1999). 
 86. Feinberg, supra note 85, at 492–93. 
 87. Id. at 490. 
 88. Demleitner, supra note 1, at 160. 
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formulation of the theory suggests some overlap with other theories, 
particularly rehabilitation and utilitarianism. 
Whether successful reintegration of an offender post-denunciation is an 
upfront goal of the denunciation theory, or whether it is a rehabilitative or 
utilitarian objective that follows only after denunciation is carried out, is 
of moderate importance. If reintegration is truly required for denunciation 
to work, then the punitive effect fails the denunciation theory terribly. 
First, the punitive effect is a punishment without an end.
89
 It presents an 
indefinite obstacle to former offenders in their attempts to obtain gainful 
employment, an obstacle that the rest of society does not have to deal with. 
Real reintegration cannot exist where the obstacles are unjustifiably 
unequal.
90
 As such, denunciation is no basis for the punitive effect. 
Even if reintegration is not a necessary aspect of denunciation, the 
punitive effect is still problematic under this theory of punishment. Society 
denounces criminal conduct by convicting and formally sentencing 
convicted defendants through its public institution for imposing criminal 
punishment—the court.91 However, society does not declare the punitive 
effect at conviction or sentencing. As an informal market sentence, the 
punitive effect is usually never declared to a convicted defendant. 
In addition, the punitive effect makes it possible for the stigma of 
criminality to follow former offenders for the rest of their lives as they 
look for job opportunities, since it allows those running the checks to 
ascertain the former offenders’ past convictions.92 Since in this vein the 
stigma is primarily made known only to employers and not generally to 
the public, the ends of the denunciation theory are not served. Society 
cannot declare its moral disgust for a criminal’s behavior if only select 
people know of it.
93
 Furthermore, absolution becomes more difficult to 
come by when the stigma is continually reported to employers and the 
harm is continually felt by former offenders. The punitive effect does not 
align with the theory of denunciation at all. 
To align the punitive effect with the denunciation theory of 
punishment, a court sentencing a convicted defendant should give notice 
to the defendant of the consequence of having to submit to future criminal 
 
 
 89. Dietrich, supra note 35, at 14. 
 90. The operative word here is “unjustifiably.” The barriers are unjustifiable in certain 
circumstances because they are imposed on too broad a population of former offenders without 
sufficiently distinguishing among them by actual risk. Reforming such over-inclusivity is not a tall 
order. 
 91. Hart, supra note 84. 
 92. See Demleitner, supra note 1, at 160. 
 93. See Demleitner, supra note 1, at 160. 
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background checks in hiring, whereby his record will be made known.
94
 
This notice need not rise to the level of a precise sentence prescribing how 
long a defendant’s record will be available because the exact consequences 
of a defendant submitting to criminal background checks in the future 
would be hard to foresee, both for the defendant and the judge. What 
matters is that notice of the general consequence is given so that the 
defendant may contemplate future economic difficulties as a consequence 
of his criminal misconduct. 
D. Rehabilitation 
Rehabilitation is the idea that former offenders can reach the same 
social status that they had before they committed their crimes. The idea is 
that society should help them get there, not necessarily by inflicting 
punishment, but rather by recognizing that offenders can learn to fit in.
95
 
Some scholars argue that rehabilitation theory is not only compatible with 
punishment, but is actually furthered by it because punishment serves to 
provide a moral education, which is the basis of rehabilitation.
96
 There is 
also a branch of rehabilitation that considers criminal behavior as a 
manifestation of illness deserving of some form of medical treatment.
97
 
More broadly, rehabilitation can be viewed as a philosophy advocating a 
 
 
 94. According to Margaret Colgate Love, this was an intended purpose of the American Bar 
Association Standards on Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary Disqualification. Margaret Colgate 
Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1728 (2002). Love also explains that the 2003 revision of the Model Penal 
Code envisioned making collateral sanctions like criminal background checks for employment a part 
of a convicted offender’s sentence. Id. at 1732. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 306.6(1) (2003).  
 95. The rehabilitation ideal has little sway, having lost much of its following after Robert 
Martinson published his famous article What Works?—Questions and Answers about Prison Reform. 
See Andrew von Hirsch, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal: Penal Policy and Social Purpose, 
131 U. PA. L. REV. 819, 820–21 (1983) (book review). In that article, Martinson reviewed various 
treatment programs intended to help offenders avoid recidivating. His conclusion was candid: 
I am bound to say that these data, involving over two hundred studies and hundreds of 
thousands of individuals as they do, are the best available and give us very little reason to 
hope that we have in fact found a sure way of reducing recidivism through rehabilitation. 
Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers about Prison Reform, 35 THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST 22, 49 (1974). Martinson’s findings contributed to the forming of the “nothing works” 
thesis. See, e.g., Jerome G. Miller, The Debate on Rehabilitating Criminals: Is It True that Nothing 
Works?, Washington Post (Mar, 1989), available at https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/rehab.html. 
 96. See Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 208, 
208 (1984) (claiming “good reason to believe” that Plato and Hegel adhered to this view, and noting 
Herbert Morris and Robert Nozick as modern adherents, having maintained that “the moral education 
which punishment effects is at least part of punishment’s justification.”); Hall, supra note 43, at 396 
(noting Plato’s belief that punishment was educational). 
 97. Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011, 1016 (1990–1991). 
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holistic approach dedicated to reforming the intrinsic motivations and 
desires of criminals to make them law-abiding.
98
 
The nexus between the punitive effect and the rehabilitation theory is 
thin. Society does not allow employers to perform criminal background 
checks as part of a moral education or treatment program for former 
offenders. And though experiencing the punitive effect may cause some 
former offenders to avoid further criminal behavior, those former 
offenders will probably tend to have lighter criminal histories than most. 
Even so, the punitive effect falls short of the rehabilitation ideal for all 
former offenders as long as they must submit to the punishment. A former 
offender may regret the moral wrong of his crime, never commit a crime 
again, and still have his criminal history reported to potential employers. It 
is actually impossible for a former offender who is subject to criminal 
background checks in hiring to attain the same status he had before having 
committing any crime. Finally, because gainful employment reduces the 
likelihood that former offenders will recidivate,
99
 freeing them from the 
punitive effect would actually serve rehabilitative ends better. It is for 
these reasons that “[t]here is widespread agreement” that criminal 
background checks in hiring “do not serve a rehabilitative function.”100 
To improve the punitive effect’s fit with rehabilitation theory, in 
addition to being given up-front notice that they will be subject to future 
criminal background checks, convicted defendants could be given 
behavioral standards to meet whereby they can eventually earn back their 
right to apply for jobs without their record being disclosed.
101
 For 
example, after serving the entirety of his sentence, a parolee who abides by 
every term of his parole for a pre-established period of time may be 
granted relief.
102
 
E. Utilitarianism 
Utilitarians may value punishment, but not in itself as retributivists do. 
“The utilitarian theory of punishment holds that punishment is a necessary 
 
 
 98. See Karl Menninger, Love Against Hate, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT, 246 (Stanley E. 
Grupp ed., Indiana University Press 1971) (effective treatment must “begin with motivating or 
stimulating or arousing in a cornered individual the wish and hope and intention to change his methods 
of dealing with the realities of life,” and noting his belief that this can be achieved “by education, 
medication, counseling, [and] training”). 
 99. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 100. Demleitner, supra note 1, at 160. 
 101. Colgate Love points out that MODEL PENAL CODE § 306.6(1) has this objective. Colgate 
Love, supra note 94, at 1732. 
 102. Colgate Love, supra note 94, at 1732. 
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evil that is justified if and only if it benefits society.”103 An alternate 
understanding of utilitarianism is that it does not value punishment at all, 
because punishment concerns the individual. Utilitarians, in contrast, focus 
on society. “Punishment,” then, is a mechanism that society leverages as it 
seeks to maximize net social benefit. Utilitarianism is a straightforward 
cost-benefit analysis; society should choose the alternative by which the 
sum of the benefits most outweighs the sum of the costs.
104
 For utilitarians 
to support criminal background checks in hiring at all, the social benefits 
must outweigh the social costs. The benefits include employers having 
information to make better hiring decisions, plus whatever benefits that 
may accrue from the punitive effect, such as if it deters any criminal 
behavior. The costs include any excessive punishment imposed on former 
offenders, as well as the incidental social effects former unemployment 
and underemployment carry. 
Utilitarians would object to similarities in punishment that the punitive 
effect inflicted on former offenders whose past crimes were of disparate 
severities (a likely outcome given the punitive effect’s tendency toward 
disproportionality). The social benefit resulting from this scheme would 
create greater market uncertainty, especially for job seekers with criminal 
records, and this uncertainty would reduce total social utility.
105
 In 
addition, the utilitarian justifiability of criminal background checks in 
hiring diminishes, and may even reach the point where it produces social 
disutility and is unjustifiable, as the criminal records of former offenders 
seeking employment become less severe, making those former offenders 
less risky to employers. Some individual former offenders also become 
less risky to hire as they pass time without recidivating. However, criminal 
records do not go away, and under the current regime neither does an 
employer’s ability to obtain them. Employer risk aversion, laissez-faire 
hiring oversight, and continued disclosure of old or mild criminal histories 
 
 
 103. Andrew R. Strauss, Losing Sight of the Utilitarian Forest for the Retributivist Trees: An 
Analysis of the Role of Public Opinion in a Utilitarian Model of Punishment, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1549, 1552 (2002). 
 104. Jeremy Bentham gave an early characterization of utilitarianism, saying that as a 
“fundamental axiom, it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and 
wrong. A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (THE COLLECTED 
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM) 393 (J. H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Clarendon Press Reissue ed. 
2009).  This notion embraces the economics concept of opportunity cost. 
 105. Total social utility is a function of the expected value of benefits, minus the expected value of 
costs. Expected value is simply the value of the cost or benefit multiplied by its respective probability 
of occurring. Greater uncertainty can mean probability is lower, because it is less reliable, which 
reduces the expected value. BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 36, at 168–71.  
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weaken the utilitarian case for the background check system as it is 
currently constructed. 
There is wide room for utilitarian reform of criminal background 
checks in hiring. Not all individuals with criminal records are necessarily a 
risk to employ. Indeed, some probably pose less risk to employers than 
certain people who do not have a criminal history at all. Consider, for 
example, former offenders who committed few offenses, committed 
offenses long in the past, committed offenses that were not severe, or 
those who endured turbulent childhoods and have succeeded in putting 
themselves on a good track in life. Compare these former offenders to 
habitual drug users or alcoholics who, though they may not have a 
criminal history, could be particularly risky to hire. If some former 
offenders have completed their sentences, lived lawfully since, and do not 
show characteristics that are predictive of risk, it may be socially 
beneficial for society to consider them as having redeemed themselves.
106
 
IV. THE REDEMPTION EXCEPTION 
The concept of redemption is based on the idea that some former 
offenders actually do rehabilitate themselves.
107
 They complete their 
formal sentences and demonstrate, after living lawfully for a time, that 
they are not true risks to employers. Unfortunately, the criminal records of 
even these individuals often remain available to employers that conduct 
background checks. When employers discover the criminal pasts of these 
redeemed former offenders, they may ascribe excessive risk to them. An 
employer who is hiring for a position for which there may be numerous 
job candidates and who is concerned with minimizing the risk of negligent 
hiring litigation may just go with an applicant with a clean record.  
Redeemed former offenders have completed their sentences and, while 
enduring the punitive effect’s additional market sentence, have stayed 
away from unlawful activity for a prolonged period of time. Their criminal 
histories remain an obstacle for them to obtain fully gainful employment 
and yet do not provide the contemplated benefit to employers since they 
communicate false risk. These redeemed former offenders should be 
considered to have reclaimed their right to apply for jobs without the 
 
 
 106. Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 15, at 328. 
 107. Regardless of how successful rehabilitation programs are in decreasing recidivism rates, 
some former offenders succeed in rehabilitating themselves. See generally Christy A. Visher & Jeremy 
Travis, Transitions from Prison to Community: Understanding Individual Pathways, 29 ANN. REV. 
SOC. 89 (2003). 
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encumbrance of a criminal history being reported. They are redeemed, 
and, so, may as well not have a criminal history. The risk profile of a 
redeemed former offender would show that they may not be any riskier to 
hire than any average person, and their risk profile is knowable. 
Government collection of vast data on offenders and modern 
information technology, the same factors that allow for inexpensive and 
easily obtainable background checks,
108
 also allow for thorough analyses 
of the risk characteristics of former offenders. Time since a former 
offender’s last offense is one of the more important variables,109 and type 
of conviction, number of convictions, time incarcerated, age, age at first 
offense, family relationships, and other variables can factor in as well.
110
 
Experts can aggregate this data and develop sophisticated risk models that 
describe, with high levels of certainty, the types of offenders statistically 
unlikely to reoffend.
111
 Using these models, lawmakers and criminal 
justice administrators can establish a certainty threshold that they consider 
appropriate for considering whether certain offenders have reached the 
point of redemption. For example, they might require a model with ninety-
eight percent certainty, meaning that only about two percent of the 
offenders the model identified as redeemed would reoffend.
112
 
Employers would continue to be able to run background checks on job 
applicants, providing much of the same social benefit that the system 
currently has. At the same time, redeemed former offenders would be 
exempt from having their criminal histories reported, reducing the social 
cost of what is currently an overinclusive punitive effect. The net result 
may be greater social benefit. However, regardless of the redemption 
standard and corresponding chosen error rate—an error rate is inevitable 
since no risk model is ever one hundred percent error-free—we must 
understand that some former offenders who meet the redemption measure 
will reoffend. Some employers will hire these former offenders after being 
unable to discover that they have criminal histories. This is a social cost of 
the redemption exemption, and the employers of these former offenders 
suffer it disproportionately. Every employer would face this risk, but few 
would actually experience it.
113
  
 
 
 108. ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 2. 
 109. Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 15, at 347 n. 30. 
 110. Id. at 335–41; Visher, supra note 107, at 94. 
 111. Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 15. 
 112. The political process could play an important role in deciding on the appropriate certainty 
threshold. Different political preferences, social values, morals, punishment theories, etc., could argue 
for higher or lower certainty thresholds.  
 113. Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 15, at 215.  
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Assuming society sets an error rate of two percent, about two percent 
of former offenders would meet the redemption standard and yet would 
reoffend. However, ninety-eight percent of former offenders predicted as 
redeemed would honor their redemption. The benefits that would accrue to 
them and to society as a result of their improved employment 
opportunities could produce a net social benefit that far outweighs the 
social loss caused by those in the two-percent error.
114
 The distribution of 
the benefits is the only issue. In the abstract, society does not face any real 
risk under this policy because it benefits broadly. Ninety-eight percent of 
those predicted to be redeemed enjoy better job prospects, the benefits of 
which are not outweighed by being wrong two percent of the time. The 
calculus is different for employers. They face the low, but still real 
possibility of hiring someone in the two percent, and if they do, they do 
not have any gain to counteract it. 
However, the point of a redemption policy based on risk analysis is to 
show that former offenders achieving redemption status are predicted to be 
no riskier than an average person. Even though it sounds like a social cost 
that a former offender who meets the redemption standard might reoffend, 
that social cost might not be any greater on average than what would have 
resulted had the employer hired an average person without a criminal 
history. Even so, if society really wants to move forward with a 
redemption policy, it can choose to compensate the few unlucky 
employers of the two percent since it will be reaping the benefits of the 
correctly redeemed ninety-eight percent.
115
 “The burden of recidivism and 
victimization should not be inflicted imprudently on the employer who 
aids the assimilation process, but rather requires a more delicate balance of 
society's interests and responsibilities.”116   
 
 
 114. See John Schmitt and Kris Warner, supra note 57. 
 115. Public policy approaches of this type are not unheard of. Consider, for example, the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA). Congress determined that expanding health insurance coverage to the 
majority of Americans would increase overall social welfare. To do so, it passed the ACA, which 
required that health insurers accept customers with preexisting conditions. However, this requirement 
alone would have been highly unprofitable for insurance companies. To make the result acceptable to 
the insurers, then, Congress required all Americans to purchase health insurance or else pay a penalty 
to the IRS, which in effect transferred some of the increased social benefit derived from expanding 
healthcare to the insurance companies. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
 116. Cindy M. Haerle, Employer Liability for the Criminal Acts of Employees Under Negligent 
Hiring Theory: Ponticas v. K.M.S. Investments, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1303, 1326 (1983–1984). 
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CONCLUSION 
The criminal background check for employment is a critically 
important and valuable tool for employers to ascertain the risk involved in 
hiring a given individual. However, criminal background checks have a 
genuinely adverse effect on a former criminal offender’s ability to get a 
job. This adverse effect is a direct consequence of a former offender’s past 
criminal activity, and but for that criminal activity the consequence would 
not exist. 
As a direct and adverse consequence of past criminal behavior, and 
because states provide employers with the ability to review the states’ 
criminal justice system records, criminal background checks in hiring 
amount to additional punishment and should be considered part of the 
formal sentence imposed by a criminal court. The fact that it is not 
imposed this way is problematic because the punishment that results from 
a former offender having to submit to criminal background checks in 
hiring lacks any justification in punishment theory. 
There are straightforward ways to rectify this shortcoming. 
Conveniently simple reforms would bolster punishment theory bases for 
the harms that the punitive effect actually imposes on former offenders. At 
sentencing, convicted defendants should be made aware that, from that 
moment forward, their criminal records will be disclosed to hiring 
employers who legally seek them. This notice will more effectively satisfy 
the goals of denunciation and retributivism. These individuals should be 
given standards that they can meet to earn back their unabridged right to 
access the job market. These standards will improve a former offender’s 
prospects for rehabilitation. And as more offenders rehabilitate 
themselves, fewer will recidivate. In addition, the risk characteristics of 
individual former offenders could be analyzed so that when a 
determination can be made with some reasonable certainty that a former 
offender does not pose significant risk to hiring employers, the former 
offender can be freed from the burden of having to find jobs with their 
criminal record holding them back. These reforms need not hamper the 
ability of employers to perform reasonable investigations into whom they 
hire, including by running background checks on job applicants. 
Going forward, while criminal record expungement options are 
available to former offenders in many jurisdictions, further research into 
how former offenders achieve redemption may allow for expanding 
expungement eligibility. Society benefits from employers being able to 
run criminal background checks on job applicants, but the social benefit 
might be greater if redeemed former offenders no longer had to submit to 
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them. Society might be better off if those individuals were free to pursue 
work without their old criminal histories holding them back. 
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